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The main objective of this article is to analyze the actions undertaken by the 
European Union (EU) as a reaction to the political and economic crisis which has 
led to a massive exodus of Venezuelan citizens in recent years (since 2015), and 
in particular after the last presidential elections. The article will outline current 
critical situation in Venezuela, first by presenting the political background and then 
by describing the general picture of the Venezuelan economy and hardships that 
resulted in this unprecedented migratory movement. Building on the hypothesis that 
being a global player is in keeping with the aspirations of the EU, the second part 
of the article analyzes both political and financial measures undertaken by various 
European institutions to help mitigate this humanitarian crisis. 
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Venezuela.
RESUMEN
El objetivo principal de este artículo es analizar las acciones emprendidas por la Unión 
Europea (UE) como una reacción a la crisis política y económica que ha causado un éxodo 
masivo de ciudadanos venezolanos en los últimos años (desde 2015) y, en particular, 
tras las últimas elecciones presidenciales. La situación crítica actual en Venezuela 
se describirá, primero, presentando los antecedentes políticos y luego describiendo 
el panorama general de la economía venezolana y las dificultades que llevaron a este 
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movimiento migratorio sin precedentes. Partiendo de la hipótesis de que la intervención 
de la UE está en consonancia con sus aspiraciones de ser un actor global, la segunda 
parte del artículo analiza las medidas tanto políticas como financieras emprendidas por 
diversas instituciones europeas para ayudar a mitigar esta crisis humanitaria.
PALABRAS CLAVE: crisis migratoria, crisis política, régimen de Maduro, Unión 
Europea, Venezuela.
Introduction
Global economic, political, and technological transformations that have been 
taking place in recent decades have contributed to the increase of the flow of 
migrants all over the world. People who suffer because of political, economic, 
or social crises in their homeland desperately seek a safer place to live. Some-
times they fear for their lives, and sometimes they simply hope to have a better 
future for them and their children. Usually, in a time of a sudden or severe 
crisis, the neighboring countries take the most immediate impact of the flow 
of migrants who flee their country. However, in the long run, the refugees look 
for brighter future in wealthier - even if distant - parts of the globe. That is why 
mass migration or forced displacement may affect not only the regions where 
it takes place but must be regarded as a broader global concern. 
In 2016, the United Nations Organization (UNO), addressing large move-
ments of refugees and migrants, adopted a resolution “New York Declaration for 
Refugees and Migrants”. The document indicated the scale of the phenomenon: 
We are witnessing in today’s world an unprecedented level of human mo-
bility. More people than ever before live in a country other than the one in 
which they were born. Migrants are present in all countries in the world. 
Most of them move without incident. In 2015, their number surpassed 244 
million, growing at a rate faster than the world’s population. However, there 
are roughly 65 million forcibly displaced persons, including over 21 million 
refugees, 3 million asylum seekers and over 40 million internally displaced 
persons. (United Nations Organization, 2016, p. 2)
European Union is one of the most desired destinations for migrants and, 
from a political and economic point of view, it is thus vitally interested in 
diminishing the problems arising from mass migration movements. The year 
2015, marked by an overflow of migrants trying to seek refuge in Europe, 
showed hard evidence of both deficiency of the European asylum system as 
well as coordination mechanisms at the national and EU levels, resulting in 
a chaotic response to the escalating problems. 
As long as there is no solution or, at least, some consensus within inter-
national community on how to cope better with large migration movements, 
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the problems will only escalate with time. It must be borne in mind that 
migration is a social phenomenon, and the impact of globalization is not 
limited to trade and information, but it also facilitates the transmission of 
social phenomena. Most likely the images of the mass migration from the 
Middle East to Europe, seen in the media and on social networks, gave the 
impulse to caravans of migrants who set out in October 2018 from Central 
America heading to the United States in search of better living conditions, 
driven by poverty and violence in their countries of origin. Their struggle 
to reach the “promised land” in the USA will also serve as an example for 
others who do not see any future in their countries and are desperate enough 
to face the challenges of migration. All this only augurs an increase in mass 
movements of population from poor and dangerous places to richer regions. 
Europe, considered one of such save havens, must both react and prepare 
adequately for current and future situations. This is particularly important 
in view of the aspirations of the European Union as one of the world political 
and economic leaders. 
There is no doubt that the Latin American region and its problems rela-
ted to mass migration movements is not a priority for the European Union, 
however, being an important actor of the international community, the EU is 
supposed to take a stand and show its capacity to  participate actively in resol-
ving conflicts in the world, whether it is in the form of political declarations, 
sanctions, etc., or the humanitarian and development aid and financial inves-
tments1. In the case of Venezuela, by using its voice and vote in international 
forums such as the United Nations, the EU is able to advocate for respect of 
human rights and a return to democracy. 
The main purpose of the article is to analyze the response of the European 
Union to the political, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, which 
has led to the mass exodus of migrants and refugees. The analysis will be ca-
rried out by presenting the causes, the effects, and the reaction of the EU to 
the phenomenon of mass migration from Venezuela. In the first part, a mul-
tidimensional background of the crisis will be outlined, then its scale and 
cross-border impact will be indicated. The second part of the article will be 
dedicated to presenting the measures undertaken by various European Union 
institutions in reaction to the political turmoil and humanitarian disaster in 
Venezuela which has led to the mass exodus from the country.  
Political crisis 
It is important to present the political background of the migration crisis be-
cause it is the main factor which contributed to the current situation in Vene-






zuela. The political factor is also relevant when analyzing the actions under-
taken by the European Union towards the Maduro regime.  
It is hard to believe that only ten years ago Venezuela was one of the ri-
chest countries in Latin America owing to the largest proved oil reserves in the 
world2. It was able to provide help for thousands of Colombian refugees who 
fled their country because of a civil war3. Now the country’s economic and 
political situation resembles a failed state rather than a prosperous country 
rich in natural resources. 
This tragic situation is the result of years of populist rule of Chávez and 
Maduro regime. In order to increase his power, Chávez focused on two goals: 
dismantling democratic institutions that could control and put limits on his 
decisions, and seizing control over the economic sector of the country. He 
succeeded in both and gradually built an authoritarian, corrupt regime. His 
successor Maduro, who took power after Chávez’s death, followed his steps 
during the first presidential term. However, in time, popular support for the 
regime started to dwindle. It was not possible to maintain social transfers on 
which the government initially had built its popularity. It turned out unfeasi-
ble to sustain country’s economic growth depending on the unstable price of 
a single commodity, oil, while importing over 70% of other goods. The wor-
sening living conditions of most of the population caused by hyperinflation, 
corruption, rampant crime, inefficiency of state institutions and public servi-
ces led to popular protests and, in 2015, to the first victory of opposition in the 
parliamentary elections  since the beginning of the Chavist regime and unin-
terrupted rule of Partido Socialista Unido Venezolano (PSUV). This victory 
was an impulse which started the course of events leading to the escalation of 
political conflict between the parliament (Asamblea Nacional - AN) and the 
government. Maduro ignored the decisions of AN and convened the National 
Constituent Assembly (Asamblea Nacional Constituyente – ANC). 
The direct reason of the current political crisis were the controversies con-
cerning the presidential elections of Maduro for the second term. The AN 
announced that the elections were fraudulent and - considering that the pre-
sidency had fallen vacant - the speaker of the AN Juan Guaidó declared him-
self acting president on 23 January 2019. Maduro ignored the decision of the 
AN. His supporters in the ANC elected a new parliament speaker Luis Parra. 
Guaidó was denied access to the parliament and started organizing massive 
2  According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (June 2014) it amounted to 
298.300 million barrels in 2013. However, Forbes points out that it may be overestimated as not 
all reserves can be technically or economically recoverable. What is more, the energy policy led 
by Chávez and his successor Maduro has not been focused on long term investment in the hu-
man resources and technical infrastructure of oil industry (Rapier, July 1, 2016). 
3  Now, Colombia is returning that help. It is hosting around one million Venezuelans and, 
in spite of the strains their presence causes for the local communities, the Colombian govern-
ment is trying hard to integrate them into the society, considering that placing them in refugee 
camps would be the last resource.
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protests as well as calling on the army to support him but the military in its 
majority decided to stay on Maduro’s side. 
The fact that Venezuela has two politicians claiming their right to presi-
dency has divided the international community. Maduro can count on the 
support of Russia (accusing the United States of an attempt of illegal regime 
change), China (the largest foreign investor and creditor of Maduro regime), 
Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Turkey, Iran, Belarus, Syria. Mexico and Uruguay 
adopted a neutral position. The following countries recognized Guaidó as an 
interim president: US, Australia, Israel, the Lima Group members except for 
Mexico (including  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatema-
la, Honduras, Paraguay and Peru), some of the European countries (Austria, 
Britain, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Poland, 
Spain, Sweden) while other members of the EU call for new presidential elec-
tions in Venezuela (BBC News, February 5, 2019). 
The continuing political turmoil has not been the only reason behind the 
mass migration of the Venezuelan citizens. The unstable political situation, 
resulting from the ineffective rule of the regime, was only one of the factors 
contributing to the growing discontent of the society. In the case of majority of 
migrants, the main reason for fleeing the country is the deepening economic 
crisis. The next chapter will give an outline of the current situation which, 
without any exaggeration, can be labelled as a deep humanitarian crisis, requi-
ring the intervention of the international community in the form of humani-
tarian aid. That is why the European Union feels compelled to participate in 
various actions undertaken to mitigate this crisis.
Economic crisis 
Main economic indicators reveal extremely bad condition of Venezuelan eco-
nomy. According to the International Monetary Fund, the 2020 projected per-
centage change of real GDP would be at -15.0 (IMF, 2019), while the estimated 
inflation rate for 2020 would reach 500,000% (World Bank, 2019). The most 
recent survey of living conditions (ENCOVI, 2020) reveals that 89% of po-
pulation live in poverty and Venezuela has the second highest homicide rate 
among Latin American and the Caribbean countries (89 per 100,000 inhabi-
tants). One of the major problems for families is unemployment and lack of fi-
nancial resources. The breakout of pandemic has only aggravated the situation 
in the labor market. Job loss due to mobility restrictions because of Covid-19 
increased by 6.9 percentage points nationwide and currently as much as 44% 
of the population age of 15 years and over is economically inactive.
Such economic crisis contributes to growing corruption and inefficiency 
of public services. According to the latest Transparency International report, 





rruption increased and 50% of those who had to use public services had to pay 
bribes. They think that the most corrupt institution is president/prime minis-
ter (87%). When asked “Is the government doing a good or bad job of fighting 
corruption?”, 91% of them answered “Bad” (Pring, Vrushi, 2019, p. 50). In the 
2019 Corruption Perception Index, among 180 countries Venezuela occupies 
position 176, with the score 16/100 (0 is highly corrupt, 100 is very clean)4, 
while the average score for the European countries is 66/100. Corruption un-
dermines foundations of democracy as it is often used for illegal funding of 
political parties or buying votes during elections. In Venezuela, more than 
20% of citizens were afraid of retaliation if they did not vote for the Maduro 
regime (Transparency International, 2019). 
Additionally, the inefficient functioning of public services, such as water or 
electricity supply, have negative impact on health services, aggravating their 
already tragic state. According to a report Encuesta Nacional de Hospitales 
19 (Organización Médicos por Salud y GIDETI, 2019)5, between November 
2018 and December 2019 barely 9% of hospitals had regular supplies of water, 
while 70% had it once or twice a week, and 20% reported not having it at all. 
Equally tragic is the situation with electricity supply. In 2019, 63% of hospi-
tals had intermittent supply of energy, and in March, during nationwide recu-
rring blackouts, there was no electricity in hospitals for a total of 507 hours. 
The report attributes 26 deaths of hospital patients to ongoing power outages 
in that period and 164 during the whole year. Another problem registered 
in  the report is the shortage of medical personnel, partly due to mass mi-
gration (the number of doctors decreased by 10% and nurses by 24% within 
a year). Because of all these problems there was also a decrease in the number 
of available operational infrastructure (the number of beds decreased by 44% 
while operating rooms were used only to 49% of their capacity). Such scar-
city of services available was also the reason for increased levels of violence 
towards hospital personnel (662 incidents in 2019) and robberies or break-ins 
(490 cases reported). 
Health and lives of Venezuelans are threatened not only by inefficient 
public services but also by shortages in food supplies. All of them being the 
consequence of collapsing economy and lack of financial resources. Only 3% 
of households report not having any problems with food supply and 30% of 
children under the age of 5 have symptoms of chronic malnutrition which will 
have irreversible impact on their future development (ENCOVI, 2020).
The general crisis has also affected the area of public education. Even 
though the number of school children has significantly decreased in Venezue-
4  Only in Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, and Somalia the level of corruption is even higher.
5  The report was prepared by Organización Médicos por Salud and GIDETI (group of Ven-
ezuelan scientists dedicated to researching tropical and infectious diseases), with the endorse-
ment of the National Assembly, National Medical Academy, and other bodies. Its aim is to pres-
ent to the public the detailed situation in the field of medical services based on surveys carried 
out in the major Venezuelan hospitals.  
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la because of migration, the accessibility of education for poor families did not 
get any better. On the contrary, the risks of educational exclusion have increa-
sed among those who cannot maintain regular school attendance (40%)6, and 
13% of children aged 3-17 do not attend school at all (ENCOVI, 2020). 
The deepening economic crisis leading to unprecedented hardships in 
everyday life (raging inflation and a continued shortage of basic food commo-
dities, deficiency of health services, etc.), combined with political instability 
and lack of hope for positive changes, has led to an increasing desire of Vene-
zuelans to leave their home country and initiated the phenomenon, which will 
be described in the following chapter.
Migration crisis
It is worth noting, that the phenomenon of migration is a general tendency 
in the region.  However, while on average the number of citizens who would 
like to emigrate reaches approximately 27% in Latin America, in Venezuela it 
amounts to 53%, the highest level among all countries, comparable only with 
Dominican Republic7. It is a drastic change, comparing to the data from 2013, 
when only 12% Venezuelans wanted to emigrate (McCarthy, 2018). Venezuela 
is also the leader of the Potential Net Migration Index (PNMI), which shows 
the future growth of population in different countries according to forecasts 
based on migration movements in and out of the country. Venezuelan score 
dropped to -20 in the years 2013-16 (McCarthy, 2018). Of course, the fact that 
so many people would see the solution to their life problems in emigration 
does not mean that most of them might fulfil their dreams. But the fact is that 
approximately 13% of the whole population (over 4 million people) have left 
the country. In the recent years, the growth rate of emigration increased by 
283.27%. The principal destinations are Colombia (41.62%), Peru (23.91%), 
the United States (10.13%), and in Europe, Spain with 6% (Expansión, 2019)8.
The scale of the phenomenon of recent mass migration from Venezuela 
was evidenced in the recent National Survey of Living Conditions 2019-2020 
6  The reasons for irregular school attendance are as follows: problems with water supply 
(23%), blackouts (17%), lack of food at home (16%), transportation (7%), lack of teachers (18%) 
(ENCOVI, 2020).
7  According to the survey conducted by Latinobarómetro, in eighteen Latin American 
countries in 2018, approximately one third of the population would like to emigrate abroad. 
The data gathered by Latinobarómetro for 2018 showed that it was a year in which all economic, 
political and social indicators fell, some of which reached the most negative figures since the 
beginning of the measurements in 1995 (Latinobarómetro, 2018). 
8  The more exact estimates of the number of emigrants are the following: 1.400.000 Co-
lombia, 870.000 Peru, 385.000 Ecuador, 371.000 Chile, 351.000 United States, 224.000 Brazil, 
145.000 Argentina, 94.000 Panama, 71.000 Mexico, 58.000 Spain, 30.000 Dominican Republic, 
28.000 Costa Rica, 21.000 Trinidad and Tobago, 20.000 Canada, 17.000 Guyana, 16.000 Aruba, 





(ENCOVI, 2020), according to which 19% of households report that at least 
one of their members emigrated to another country in the 2014-2019 period. 
Moreover, half of the population that flees the country is young (aged bet-
ween 15-20) and 23% have a university degree. The fact that the country will 
lose young, educated population will be a huge problem both for the national 
demography and labor market. The main reason for emigration declared in 
the survey is the lack of employment and economic resources (82.8%), while 
political reasons are mentioned by only 1.3%. Before 2019 only 4% declared 
the will to return to the home country in the future and although the outbreak 
of the Covid-19 pandemic and subsequent lockdown made it more difficult to 
emigrate, it will not stop the exodus.  
In addition to being confronted with a systematic disinformation on the part 
of the authorities, Venezuelan citizens suspiciously look at the measures the go-
vernment undertakes in the face of the migration crisis. Some independent jour-
nalists maintain that the massive exodus comes in handy for the Maduro regime 
both from political and economic point of view. On the one hand, there is less 
political pressure as those who migrate often are opponents of the regime and that 
would explain the easing of barriers for getting passports. What is more, with the 
depopulation of the country by millions of citizens, there is lesser demand for pu-
blic services. On the other hand, many Venezuelan families live off the remittances 
sent from abroad. It is estimated that for 2017 remittances reached around 2 bi-
llion dollars (Hermoso, 2018). In 2017 only 8% of households received remittan-
ces, while in 2019-20 this number reached 30% (ENCOVI, 2020).
Impact on neighboring countries
One of important observations concerning the Venezuelan migratory crisis is 
the fact that it is a part of a global phenomenon of the so-called “large move-
ments”. They differ from regular flow of migrants which happens constantly all 
over the world, and generally without incidents. According to UN Declaration 
for Refugees and Migrants (2016), large movements “may involve mixed flows 
of people, whether refugees or migrants, who move for different reasons but 
who use similar routes”. 
Such is the case of exodus from Venezuela where people leave the coun-
try not because of war, natural disaster, or ethnic cleansing. They leave the 
country being motivated by economic difficulties resulting from political cri-
sis which have, in turn, led to a humanitarian disaster (further exacerbated 
by the Covid-19 pandemic). Besides all challenges that refugees and migrants 
usually face, they pose a serious problem for receiving neighboring or transit 
countries. Even though the international legal status of migrants and refugees 
is different, still equal human rights and fundamental freedoms apply to them. 
In case of Venezuelan migration crisis, it is Colombia and Peru that are mainly 
affected as host countries. Such a huge inflow of people seeking refuge has 
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very deep repercussions in both economic and social sphere, particularly in 
employment, health, and education. 
The MMC Research Report (2019) prepared by the Mixed Migration Cen-
ter in collaboration with the Danish Refugee Council gives an overview of 
problems in the neighboring transit or host countries resulting from the exo-
dus of Venezuelans. The key findings are as follows: 1) lack of financial resou-
rces exposes the migrants to all kinds of risks on the way out of the country, 
including crime, physical assault or sexual gender-based violence; 2) they face 
racism and discrimination as their growing number in host countries is provo-
king xenophobia; 3) to limit the influx of the increasing number of migrants, 
host countries start to impose stricter immigration rules; 4) not being able to 
comply with requirements of stricter immigration law, more and more Ve-
nezuelans try to enter the host countries illegally; 5) illegal movement across 
borders increases the demand of smuggling services and exposes migrants to 
higher risk of exploitation (MMC Research Report, 2019, p.7). 
Although the migratory movements bring forth various negative conse-
quences, it is worth noting some of their positive aspects as well. The positives 
are quite often ignored by citizens of host countries, who perceive immigrants 
as a threat to their economic stability, employment, safety, etc. In crisis si-
tuations, and such is the exodus of Venezuelans, xenophobia and prejudices 
spread easily, obscuring hard economic data. 
One of the countries affected by Venezuelan migration is Peru, which must 
cope with approximately 870,000 immigrants. In 2019, the World Bank prepared 
a report indicating how immigrants contribute to Peruvian economy and what 
the Peruvian State should do to better use their potential. It is worth noting that 
they are mainly young (42% are between 18 – 29 years of age), and what is more, 
57% of working-age Venezuelans in Peru have higher education, and of these, 
half have a university degree. It is estimated that, in 2008, about 8% of Peruvian 
GDP growth was due to their contribution. The World Bank estimates that if the 
integration of Venezuelans into the local labor market becomes a reality, they 
could increase Peruvian productivity by 3.2%. Even working in informal sector, 
they can generate tax revenue of about 2.25 billion soles (World Bank, 2019). 
Nonetheless, the World Bank report seems to be more optimistic than 
the forecasts made by the International Monetary Fund, which foresees that 
the migration wave may reach up to 10 million people in 2023. It would im-
ply increase in public spending on humanitarian aid, healthcare, education, 
and other public services. IMF estimates that by 2023 this kind of expen-
diture could reach 0.6% of GDP in Colombia, 0.3% in Ecuador and Peru, 
and 0.1% in Chile (Corugedo, Guajardo, November 21, 2019). Even though 
Venezuelans could potentially raise GDP growth in the recipient countries 
by 0.1 to 0.3 percentage points during 2017-2030, in the short term they 
contribute to some difficulties in local labor markets by displacing domestic 






The European Union’s political reaction to the crisis 
in Venezuela
The European Union, as a global player, takes a role of an advocate for human 
rights and democracy. That is why it took a stand in the case of the deepening 
crisis in Venezuela. Analyzing the steps undertaken by the EU, it is evident 
that the primary concern of the EU is to press Maduro regime to agree to fair 
elections and find a peaceful solution for the political conflict. The migration 
issue is regarded rather as a humanitarian disaster than a political issue (in 
fact, most of the Venezuelan migrants are not asylum-seekers). 
One of the first reactions of the European Union to the political crisis re-
sulting from the conflict between the Maduro’s government and the parlia-
mentary majority was the resolution adopted on July 18, 2016. The EU expres-
sed interest in Venezuela gaining political stability. One of the reasons, apart 
from historical cultural ties with the country, was the fact that at that time over 
600.000 Europeans resided there. In the conclusion, the Council of the EU 
urged the High Representative, the EEAS and the EU Commission to support 
mediation mission of the former presidents Mr. José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, 
Mr. Leonel Fernández and Mr. Martín Torrijos, who acted under auspices of 
the Union for South American Nations, to help maintain dialogue between 
the government and the parliamentary majority in Venezuela (Council of the 
EU, July 18, 2016). 
The following year, Venezuela was the subject of three conclusions and one 
decision on introducing targeted sanctions. In May, the EU again called for solu-
tion to the deepening crisis in Venezuela, indicating that the mediation had not 
brought any results up to that moment. However, apart from recalling, urging, 
expecting, and encouraging to resolve the growing problems, the EU did not take 
any firm action (Council of the EU, May 15, 2017). Next, there was a declaration 
by the High Representative Federica Mogherini (Council of the EU, July 26, 2017). 
It referred to the situation in Venezuela ahead of the election for the Constituent 
Assembly on 30 July 2017. Once again, after mentioning the escalating problems 
in Venezuela, there was a call for peaceful negotiations and responsibility of public 
authorities in view of infringement of fundamental rights of citizens. 
Finally, in November, along with the conclusions (Council of the EU, No-
vember 13, 2017), the Council announced the decision to adopt restrictive 
measures voted by unanimity. The imposed measures included: 1) export res-
trictions concerning arms, equipment which could be used for internal re-
pressions, or equipment, technology, and software intended for the monito-
ring of the internet and telephone communications by the Venezuelan regime; 
2) restrictions on admission of natural persons responsible for serious human 
rights violations or whose actions undermine democracy or the rule of law 
in Venezuela; 3) freezing of funds and economic resources of natural or legal 
persons, entities or bodies responsible for serious human rights violations in 
Venezuela (Council of the European Union, November 14, 2017). 
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Along with the deepening of the crisis in Venezuela, the political activity 
of the EU increased and, in 2018, eight declarations concerning Venezuela 
were made. After the presidential and regional elections which were held on 
20 May, the EU criticized irregularities which occurred, such as lack of poli-
tical pluralism and transparency, biased electoral conditions, obstacles to the 
participation of opposition political parties  or an unbalanced composition 
of the National Electoral Council (Council of the European Union, May 22, 
2018). On the next day, the EU reiterated the discontent with the electoral pro-
cess through a joint declaration of the G-7 leaders, including Canada, Fran-
ce, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America 
(European Council, May 23, 2018). The declaration included the call on the 
Venezuelan government to schedule new, fair elections. 
In the following conclusions, adopted by the Council of the European 
Union on 28 May, there is finally a mention of the migration crisis:
The EU is deeply concerned about the pressing humanitarian needs of 
the population, including of many Europeans citizens residing in the country, 
which need to be addressed urgently. The worsening crisis is causing mass 
migration that creates challenges to host communities and to regional stabili-
ty. The EU calls on the Venezuelan Government to take immediate action to 
alleviate the impact of the crisis. 10. The European Union will continue and 
step up its support to the population of Venezuela, also in neighboring coun-
tries, supporting the socio-economic inclusion of Venezuelans and resilience 
of host communities. (Council of the European Union, May 28, 2018)
The next step was taken by the EU on 25 June, with the decision on the 
amendment of the list of 7 Venezuelan officials on sanction lists by 11 more 
representants of the Maduro regime (Council of the European Union, June 
25, 2018). 
On 15 October, another EU body discussed the Venezuelan crisis. It was 
the Foreign Affairs Council. The High Representative and foreign ministers 
discussed the idea of establishing a contact group to help carry out the poli-
tical solution of the Venezuelan crisis. They also discussed the impact of Ve-
nezuelan migration in the neighboring countries; however, the discussion on 
external aspects of migrations was mainly focused on Libya and the strategic 
partnership between the EU, the IOM and the UNHCR in Libya (European 
Council, October 15, 2018). 
Very soon, further concern of the EU for the situation in Venezuela was 
expressed. The High Representative Federica Mogherini once again mentio-
ned the issue of migration in the declaration pronounced on 25 October 2018: 
The EU and its Member States will step up their support to national, re-
gional and multilateral efforts aimed at mitigating the effects of the migrant 





the country. Countries in the region and their citizens should be supported 
in this challenging situation. This regional crisis requires regional and glo-
bal concerted responses. In this respect, the EU welcomes the appointment of 
Mr. Eduardo Stein as Joint Special Representative of UNHCR and IOM for 
Venezuelan refugees and migrants. The EU calls on the Venezuelan govern-
ment to take concrete action to alleviate the impact of the crisis, including the 
facilitation of external cooperation to address the most urgent needs of the 
population. (Council of the European Union, October 25, 2018)
The next step undertaken by the EU to exert pressure on the Maduro re-
gime was to renew for another year the embargo on arms and the sanctions 
imposed on 18 Venezuelan officials (Council of the European Union, Novem-
ber 6, 2018). 
In the beginning of 2019, apart from declarations expressing disagreement 
and discontent with the fact that Maduro decided to inaugurate his presiden-
tial mandate and later violently responded to popular protests, the EU decided 
to take part in establishing an international contact group on Venezuela. Its 
purpose was the following:
… promote a common understanding and a more concerted approach 
among key international actors on the situation in Venezuela aiming at a pea-
ceful and democratic solution to the current crisis. The group will help to build 
trust and create the necessary conditions for a credible process to emerge, in 
line with the relevant provisions of the Venezuelan Constitution, enabling Ve-
nezuelans to determine their own future, through the holding of new elections 
with all guarantees for a free and fair electoral process, supervised by inter-
national independent observers. The objective is not to be a mediator but to 
support a political dynamic that the group can then further accompany and 
consolidate. (Council of the European Union, January 31, 2019) 
The main purpose of the International Contact Group (ICG) was to convince 
Maduro to organize new elections within 90 days. The inaugural meeting of the 
ICG took place during the conference co-hosted by Uruguay and the EU in Mon-
tevideo on 7 February 2019. The group included the EU, eight of its Member Sta-
tes (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Panama, Portugal, Spain, Sweden), 
the United Kingdom, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Ecuador. Maduro 
welcomed this initiative of talks with opposition, but Guaidó accused Maduro of 
using this to prolong and strengthen his regime and refused to enter the dialogue 
with him (Aguilar Ybarra, February 4, 2019). The ICG did not achieve its goal as 
Maduro ignored its 90-days deadline for organizing new elections.
Within 2019 and 2020 there were various declarations, in which the EU 
reiterated its support to the political solution of the crisis as well as its readi-
ness to increase humanitarian and development aid, condemned the Maduro 
regime for not letting in humanitarian aid from abroad, expressed concern 
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about personal freedom and safety of Juan Guaidó, condemned the fact that 
the German ambassador in Venezuela was pressed to leave the country, called 
for releasing political prisoners, extended the sanctions to more regime offi-
cials, etc. The sanctions against 11 high officials announced on 29 June 2020 
almost caused the disruption of diplomatic ties between the EU and Vene-
zuela. The reaction of the Maduro government after the EU announced the 
sanctions was to declare Isabel Brilhante Pedrosa, Head of the Delegation of 
the European Union in Caracas, a persona non grata and demand that the 
EU Ambassador leave Venezuela within 72 hours. The EU condemned the 
decision and announced that it would keep on supporting Venezuelan citizens 
in their strive for democracy and would continue the humanitarian assistance 
(European Council, 2020). However, on 2 July, after the phone conversation 
between Josep Borrell, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, and Jorge Arreaza, the Venezuelan Minister of 
People’s Power for Foreign Affairs, the Venezuelan government revoked that 
decision and agreed on the need to maintain diplomatic relations at the highest 
level in order to facilitate political dialogue and cooperation (EEAS, 2020).
It is worth noting that various international bodies made efforts to con-
tribute to the resolution of the Venezuelan crisis. One of them is the Organi-
zation of American States (OAS), which brings together 35 Latin American 
countries as well as 69 permanent observers (one of them is the European 
Union) and is considered as an important forum of political dialogue in the 
Western Hemisphere. The OAS took various steps to find political solution 
for the problem and published reports denouncing the deterioration of the 
rule of law and democratic institutions in Venezuela. Unfortunately, none of 
its initiatives received enough support from its members to have a major po-
litical impact 9. Nonetheless, at least the OAS managed to attract attention of 
the international community to the multidimensional crisis in Venezuela by 
presenting it in the International Criminal Court (Krzywicka, 2019). 
The reaction of the EU to the deepening crisis in Venezuela was not limi-
ted to the above-mentioned political declarations and sanctions. Other mea-
sures were taken to help Venezuelan citizens who decided to flee the country 
submerged in a total chaos on the verge of collapse. These measures will be 
described in the next chapter.
The European Union’s humanitarian 
help for Venezuelan migrants
Since 2016, when the political and economic crisis in Venezuela became more 
acute, various EU bodies have been taking steps in reaction to the develop-
ments in Venezuela as well as participating in actions undertaken by different 





international entities. The political reaction of the EU has been described in 
the previous chapter and this one will focus on humanitarian aid provided for 
Venezuelan migrants.
The analysis of the Political Guidelines for the Next European Commis-
sion 2019-2024, prepared by Ursula von der Leyen (Von der Leyen, 2019), 
reveals that the problem of migration has its place among the priorities of 
the European Commission, however, it is perceived rather from a perspective 
of events which took place in Europe and neighboring countries and which 
unsettled the sense of security of many Europeans. It is enclosed in the words 
“Protecting our European way of life”. The proposals for action comprise the 
following: strengthening the external borders, modernizing the Common Eu-
ropean Asylum System (with the emphasis on being common, as recent years 
showed that not all Member States agree on common policy in this area), im-
proving internal security by having better instruments to fight against trans-
national crime and terrorism, reinforcing customs control to better protect 
the European single market. Although the document reaffirms the need to 
provide aid and development cooperation to the countries of origin of the 
immigrants, the only region that is mentioned is Africa, the region which has 
the most direct impact on the EU in the context of migration and security. 
The document also reveals one of the major weaknesses of the EU – its 
decision-making process. To improve it, Ursula von der Leyen proposed to re-
place the unanimity voting by majority voting. She also suggested more coor-
dinated external actions, particularly in development aid and security policy. 
But then again, the focus is on neighboring countries as most immigrants, in 
particular illegal ones, come from them. 
When analyzing the annual 2020 EU budget, it is also evident that, at pre-
sent, the Venezuelan crisis is not a priority for Europe. The budget had to be 
urgently amended to provide more financial resources in the area of particular 
importance: the Covid-19 crisis, which is the mayor challenge Europe is facing 
currently (Council of Europe, 2020). In fact, the budget was amended various 
times within 2020, and some of the amendments were addressing the problem 
of migration, however, the focus was on Syrian refugees and the humanitarian 
help for them and host or transit countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, 
and Greece.  
Nonetheless, the European Union is not ignoring the Venezuelan migra-
tion crisis. It is worth noting that, in 2019, for the first time since the peak 
of migration crisis in Europe, which took place in 2015, there was a rise in 
applications for asylum. What is more, in 2019, Spain received more asylum 
applications than during the 2015, and it was due to about 46.000 Venezuelan 
citizens who applied for asylum10. Their applications got much higher rate of 
10  One of the reasons why Venezuelans choose Europe as a destination is the fact that for the 
time being (until 2022, when the European Travel Information and Authorization System ETIAS 
will be launched) they do not need visa to enter the Schengen Area.
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approval, reaching the level of 96 % in 2019, as compared to 29 % in 2018 
(EASO, 2020). 
The European Union offers humanitarian help mainly through a specia-
lized body – the European Commission Civil Protection and Humanitarian 
Aid Operations (ECHO) department. It has been active since 1992 and has an 
annual budget of approximately €1 billion. The legal basis for its activity is set 
up in the article 214 of the Lisbon Treaty:
1. The Union’s operations in the field of humanitarian aid shall be con-
ducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the external 
action of the Union. Such operations shall be intended to provide ad hoc 
assistance and relief and protection for people in third countries who are vic-
tims of natural or man-made disasters, in order to meet the humanitarian 
needs resulting from these different situations. The Union’s measures and tho-
se of the Member States shall complement and reinforce each other.
2. Humanitarian aid operations shall be conducted in compliance with 
the principles of international law and with the principles of impartiality, 
neutrality and non-discrimination. (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007)
 
In the case of the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, since 2018 the EU 
donated €156 million. The funds were allocated both for projects inside the 
country and for neighboring countries which have been hosting Venezuelan 
migrants. Help was provided in the area of healthcare, water, sanitation, edu-
cation, protection, food. The EU also included help for Venezuela within the 
frames of its Coronavirus Global Response. It organized Humanitarian Air 
Bridge, delivering 82.5 tons of life-saving material. The operation was carried 
out jointly by the EU, Spain, Portugal, in coordination with the authorities 
of Venezuela (ECHO, n.d.).  Also, the ECHO contributed €3.2 million to the 
activities of UNICEF aimed at bringing relief to migrant children and host 
families in Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago (UNICEF, 2020). 
Another example of aid is the project “Cities of Solidarity” (€16 million), ai-
med at helping local administration in cities which receive migrants and re-
fugees to integrate them socially and economically into the local community. 
The EU also donated €9 million to support the Pan-American Health Organi-
zation in combating Covid-19 (EEAS, May 26, 2020a). 
In order to raise awareness about the tragic situation of the Venezuelan mi-
grants and mobilize funds for their urgent needs, the EU organized the Inter-
national Solidarity Conference on the Venezuelan Refugee and Migrant Crisis, 
which took place in Brussels on 28-29 October 2019. The conference was orga-
nized by the EU, UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), and the International Organi-
zation for Migration (IOM). The participants included various EU institutions, 
representatives of Member States and affected Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, donors, UN agencies, private sector, NGOs, as well as international 





This is a moment to call for even greater support for Venezuelan refugees, 
migrants and their host communities by the international community. We 
want to raise awareness about the gravity of this crisis, we want to confirm 
and increase international support for a regional and coordinated response. 
The EU is already the leading donor and key political player, providing €170 
million since 2018 in support of the Venezuelan people. (UNHCR, 2019)
That conference was not a pledging one, but it was followed by another 
event, this time virtual, aimed at collecting funds for Venezuela. The Donors 
Conference in Solidarity with Venezuelan Refugees and Migrants in Coun-
tries in the Region, Amid the COVID-19 Pandemic, was held on 26 May 2020. 
It was organized by the EU, together with the Spanish government and with 
support of the UNHCR, the IOM, Norway and Canada. It raised €3.1 billion 
from over 60 countries and institutions. The European Union’s contribution 
reached €144 million (including €50 million from Spain), while the European 
Investment Bank offered €400 million in loans (EEAS, May 26, 2020b).
As it was mentioned before, the humanitarian aid from the part of the EU 
is channeled in various ways and in cooperation with different international 
organizations. One of the examples is the Red Cross EU Office, which compri-
ses 27 National Red Cross Societies from all EU Member States along with  the 
Norwegian Red Cross, the British Red Cross, and the International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Since 2018, it has been providing 
help for the Venezuelans on the move in the bordering countries (Colom-
bia, Peru, Ecuador). The project focuses on health assistance and facilitation 
of communication between migrants and their families. The partners in this 
project are German and Spanish Red Cross, the European Commission’s Di-
rectorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Ope-
rations as well as Colombian, Peruvian and Ecuadorian Red Cross (Red Cross 
EU Office, n. d.).
Apart from providing help in emergency situations, the European Union is 
also the biggest donor of the development assistance in the world. 
When analyzing the budget of donors and recipient countries, it is visible 
that member states focus their interests on particular recipient countries. In case 
of Venezuela, the biggest donor is Spain, the country with the closest historical, 
cultural and economic bonds with Venezuela. Its disbursement reached €146.45 
million of the total sum of development assistance donated to Venezuela in the 
years 2007-2020, which amounted to € 442.57 million (EU Aid Explorer, n.d.). 
The above-mentioned financial resources are not the only form of help 
provided by the EU to Venezuela in its critical situation. There is a range of 
other European entities, NGOs, organizations, etc., which have been sending 
humanitarian aid to Venezuela and the host countries for the Venezuelan mi-
grants and refugees. The European Union provides humanitarian aid within 
its budget funds, but we must not forget that also Member States, on their 
own, organize or take part in actions of humanitarian or development help. 
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There is no doubt that Venezuela is not a priority, especially nowadays, during 
the economic problems caused by the pandemic even in wealthy countries, 
however the European Union is not withdrawing from the international arena.
Conclusions
It is unquestionable that the European Union is trying to play an active role in 
world politics and, as one of the wealthiest and safest regions, it is willing to 
take some responsibilities in view of crisis situations in different parts of the 
globe. Of course, closer the problems are to the European borders, the more 
willing Member States are to act. Obviously, the Venezuelan migration crisis 
does not have such a direct impact on the EU as do the migration waves co-
ming from across the EU borders. This is the reason why the reaction of the 
EU bodies, particularly in its political dimension, may seem rather cautious 
and not very swift, based mainly on reiterative declarations and statements. 
It seems that the EU, having in mind the colonial past of some of its members, 
does not want to be perceived as an entity which imposes political solutions 
concerning internal matters of other countries. However, the EU actively par-
ticipates in providing humanitarian aid to the Venezuelan migrants and coo-
perates with other organizations to this end. Unfortunately, despite reluctantly 
accepting some humanitarian aid, the Maduro regime does not respect any 
declarations or calls pronounced by the EU. Even the imposed sanctions do 
not change his stand. In a way, it shows the weakness and ineffectiveness of the 
measures that are at the disposal of the EU and the whole international com-
munity. Nonetheless, the direct humanitarian aid provided by the European 
institutions and Member States is priceless for the people fleeing the totally 
collapsed country. 
Apart from taking action in face of critical situations, such as the case of 
Venezuela, the international community should start thinking of the migra-
tion in more general terms, having in mind the rising scale of this phenome-
non. It should reconsider the legal status and approach towards migrants as 
quite often their factual situation does not fit the categories ascribed to people 
who flee their country. For example, Venezuelan migrants, who in their ma-
jority do not have the refugee status, can be labelled as “survival migrants”, as 
their exodus is motivated by an extremely difficult economic situation which 
is, in turn, caused by poor governance and political crisis rather than political 
persecution per se. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that they are fleeing 
“massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have se-
riously disturbed public order”, thus complying with the definition of refugees 
adopted in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration (UNHCR, 1984). The legal status 
of migrants is very important with regard to their rights in the host countries 
and the responsibility of the international community to protect them and 





relief at the borders in situations of acute crisis provoked by mass influx of 
people is not enough in the long run. The development-based approach to 
displacement is necessary, aimed at the socio-economic inclusion of displaced 
populations rather than their encampment in refugee camps established in the 
host countries. This approach is much more beneficiary for all stakeholders 
involved. 
Summing up the analysis of the European Union’s actions in the face of 
the Venezuelan migratory crisis, I would like to bring up two quotes by Josep 
Borrell, the present High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy. He was appointed to hold this position on 1 December 2019 
and migratory issues as well as many other problems that beset the world have 
been constantly present on his agenda, especially now, when all the political 
and economic problems are being augmented by the Covid-19 pandemic. He 
said: “We cannot change big global trends, but we can change how we respond 
to them.” This is his vision of the role of Europe, as a “partner of choice” for 
other countries or regions. However, he realizes the weaknesses of the Euro-
pean decision-making process: 
By investing more in unity, all Member States would gain in influence, be-
cause by slowing things down or weakening our capacity to act, they also harm 
themselves. In the EU, what matters is not how a discussion begins, with a ran-
ge of views among 27 countries, each with their own histories and different in-
terests. What matters is how a discussion ends, with a common vision on what 
to do and a commitment to put resources behind it. (Borrell, 2020)
This is a constant point of contention when it comes to political or finan-
cial engagement of the EU in the world. On the one hand, there are interests of 
particular Member States, and on the other, a broader vision of Europe’s role as 
one of the world leaders, which comes with a cost. Considering all the challen-
ges that both the European Union and Europe as a continent face currently, 
it doesn not seem probable that Venezuela, or Latin American region would 
at some point gain more importance in the European agenda. Nonetheless, 
any kind of help, whether in the form of financial resources or humanitarian 
assistance, is absolutely essential and more than welcomed by the Venezuelan 
citizens in their tragic situation. The political issues and implications on the 
relations with the Venezuelan government  should not be placed before the 
moral obligation to follow the ideals on which the European Union was foun-
ded. The challenge that Europe keeps on facing was expressed in the European 
Agenda on Migration: 
We need to restore confidence in our ability to bring together European and 
national efforts to address migration, to meet our international and ethical obli-
gations and to work together in an effective way, in accordance with the princi-
ples of solidarity and shared responsibility. (European Commission, 2015)
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The key word when it comes to the European Union’s efforts to mitigate 
negative impact of mass migration movements both within the EU and in 
Latin America is cooperation. It must be a multilateral cooperation within the 
entire international community so that the solutions bring benefits not only 
to the population seeking help but to their host countries and other stakehol-
ders involved as well. Individual country actions aiming at defending strictly 
national interests, such as for example border restrictions, will not solve the 
problem of mass movement of migrants. 
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